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The literature of feminist pedagogy emphasizes the transformation of women
from passive recipients of knowledge to active knowers who see themselves as
agents of social change. This transformation is linked to consciousness-raising
and experiential learning — as means to empower students. I here discuss prob-
lems encountered as a white, heterosexual teacher developing such pedagogical
practices in the university classroom, showing how these problems are related to
the unexamined epistemological basis of these practices. I show how an over-
emphasis on subjective, experiential learning can lead to epistemological relativ-
ism as resistance to the hegemony of Eurocentric, academic feminism. Challenges
to my authority as a white academic “expert” have led me to advocate a feminist
pedagogy based on relational thinking that brings together subjective and
objective dimensions of knowing. Ironically, this approach heightens rather than
diminishes the contradictions we face as feminist teachers.
Les écrits sur la pédagogie féministe mettent l’accent sur la transformation des
femmes, de réceptrices passives des connaissances à connaisseures actives qui se
voient comme des agentes des changements sociaux. Cette transformation est liée
à la conscientisation et à l’apprentissage par l’expérience personnelle, deux
moyens de responsabiliser les étudiants. L’auteure analyse des problèmes aux-
quels elle a à faire face en tant que professeure hétérosexuelle de race blanche
ayant recours à de telles méthodes pédagogiques à l’université; elle explique
comment ces problèmes sont reliés au fait que le fondement épistémologique de
ces méthodes n’a pas été approfondi. Elle montre comment la trop grande impor-
tance accordée à l’apprentissage au moyen d’expériences subjectives peut mener
à un relativisme épistémologique qui correspond à une forme de résistance à
l’hégémonie du féminisme universitaire eurocentrique. La contestation de l’auto-
rité de l’auteure en tant qu’“experte” universitaire de race blanche l’a amenée à
prôner une pédagogie féministe reposant sur une pensée relationnelle qui con-
jugue les dimensions subjectives et objectives de la connaissance. Ironiquement,
cette approche intensifie les contraditions auxquelles font face les professeures
féministes, plutôt que de les diminuer.
“Women’s studies” aims to transform women from objects to subjects of
inquiry. In feminist research, this has meant “research by women, on
women, for women” (Stanley & Wise, 1983, pp. 17–20).2 Feminist research
differs from that designated as malestream in its use of methodologies that
empower participants through inclusion in all stages of inquiry (see, for
example, Klein, 1983; Mies, 1983; Ralph, 1988). Inclusion necessitates
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rejection of the hierarchical relationships and proscriptions of objectivity
characteristic of normal scientific practice. In teaching, the transformation of
the student from passive recipient of “truth” to a subject actively engaged in
constructing knowledge has become a central goal of feminist pedagogy.
Adrienne Rich (1979) distinguishes between receiving and claiming an
education: although receiving an education is to come into possession of; to
act as receptacle or container for; to accept as authoritative or true— claim-
ing an education is to take as rightful owner; to assert in the face of possible
contradiction (p. 231). For women, Rich argued, this means refusing to let
others do the thinking, talking and naming. Although this pedagogy finally
challenges the conceptual separation of production (that is, through academic
research) and transmission (that is, through teaching) of knowledge, I begin
my inquiry with transmission.
The purpose of this paper is to share and to analyze problems I have
encountered as a white, heterosexual teacher attempting to develop a femin-
ist practice in the classroom. In order to make sense of my experiences, I
review feminist criticism of traditional approaches to learning which lead to
classroom practice that over-emphasizes reason while neglecting intuition
and emotion. From this perspective, a number of writers suggest we abandon
all prescriptions for objectivity in knowledge. In my own classroom, how-
ever, this notion of purely subjective knowledge often led to the claim that
because all knowledge is relative no universally valid knowledge of women
is possible. This relativism acted to hinder rather than to encourage sharing
of knowledge among students. On that basis, I explore relational ways of
knowing as an alternative, to connect subjective and objective knowledge.
In this exploration I examine the role experience plays in the construction of
theory, the relevance of theoretical knowledge for political struggle, and the
problems arising from the institutionalization of feminism as an academic
specialty.
Although anger aroused by curriculum in women’s studies is a response
familiar to me as a feminist, my most difficult and worrisome moments as
a feminist teacher concern anger that comes from the classroom— including
teacher/student and student/student dynamics — rather than from course con-
tent.3 In the extreme, this anger led to an encounter during which unbridled
emotion on the part of a handful of students threatened to create divisions
within the class difficult to remedy through appeals to “reason.” As we shall
see, I do not view this anger as a problem to be resolved simply through
“proper” technique or teaching method. Rather, I view it as arising from
contradictions inherent in the endeavour to bring feminism into the class-
room. These contradictions led me to explore how attempts to reclaim sub-
jectivity through experiential learning, as a goal of feminist pedagogy, raise
important epistemological questions. Although debates about the efficacy of
feminist theorizing are not new to the women’s movement,4 the collision of
experiential and theoretical knowledge in the classroom has not yet received
widespread consideration in published literature.5 As a contribution to the
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emerging discussion of this issue, this paper moves beyond the question of
classroom practice to an interrogation of both the current conditions under
which we struggle to employ a feminist approach to learning and to the
epistemological base of practice.
THE SUBJECT IN THE CLASSROOM: CHALLENGES TO OBJECTIVITY
By now, a large literature sketches out the characteristics of a distinctly
feminist style of teaching in the classroom (see Klein, 1987). Although the
notion of “critical” pedagogy for feminist teaching is ambiguous, Elizabeth
Ellsworth (1989) connects it to the rejection of oppression, injustice, silenc-
ing of marginalized voices, and authoritarian social structures (p. 300). The
goals are generally identified with:
critical democracy, individual freedom, social justice and social change — a
revitalized public sphere characterized by citizens capable of confronting public
issues critically through ongoing forms of public debate and social action.
Students would be empowered by social identities that affirmed their race, class,
and gender positions, and provided the basis for moral deliberation and social
action. (Ellsworth, 1989, p. 300)
Interactive participation in the classroom, achieved through the principles of
openness, promotion of equality, trust-building, and respect for differences
(Disch & Thompson, 1990, p. 69; see also Schniedewind, 1983) receive
emphasis. Feminist pedagogy, as part of this “critical” or “radical” approach
to teaching, emphasizes the particular rather than the universal, in order to
bring the least members up to relations of equality, and draws on “lost parts
of self” by bringing into focus the feel of self (Moe, 1990). This approach
requires that the learner consult with others, and is contrasted with methods
emphasizing how knowledge can be generalized and universalized, maintain
or increase status differentials between persons by positing the knower as
expert, and focus upon the logic of self. In these ways, feminist pedagogy
has been established as much more than transformation of the curriculum: it
entails transformation of women as knowers.6 Although there is disagree-
ment about the nature of the transformation required, most writers link it to
rejection of the prescriptions of scientific objectivity. These Western
methods of inquiry maintain that the thinker can acquire knowledge of the
world through the exercise of disembodied Reason. Rich (1976), for
example, argued that objectivity, as that detached attitude of science which
demands the researcher remain emotionally uninvolved so as to view all
social phenomena as “things,” merely represents the term that men have
applied to their own subjectivity. Central to her claim is the Cartesian
method,7 which separates soul/mind and body in ways that explicitly support
the principle of men’s domination of women (see Bordo, 1987; Fox Keller,
1985; Lloyd, 1984; Merchant, 1980). As Science gained ascendancy during
the seventeenth century, Reason came to be seen as a distinguishing feature
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of human nature and as a distinctive mode of abstract thinking giving male
content to what it means to be a good knower.8 Scientific discoveries9 —
such as the sun being much larger than it appears to the eye— drew atten-
tion to the way the senses, as well as emotional commitment to beliefs,
could lead to error in the pursuit of truth. As Bordo (1987) notes, by thus
locating error outside the faculty of Reason, Descartes upheld then-dominant
beliefs in Godly goodness and perfection: Descartes solved the “problem of
evil” by locating threatening elements “outside” the intellect, associating
them with the impurity of the animal-like body (p. 81; see also Douglas,
1982). Although drawing upon already-prevalent disdain for the body,
Descartes went to the extreme of defining body and mind in terms of mutual
exclusivity.
Genevieve Lloyd (1984), in particular, explicates the ways Cartesian
dualism— however unintentionally — provided justification for a sexual divi-
sion of mental labour. Within the legacy of normative dualism, “woman”10
has been associated with the body, “man” with the mind, hence Reason.
Moreover, the categories of male/masculinity are constructed in opposition
to those of female/femininity, in a way that requires negative evaluation of
polar opposites: reason versus emotionality as unreason; the universal
opposed to the particular as parochial; transcendence as a higher state than
immanence; doing juxtaposed to merely being; culture as above nature;
order preferred to disorder; and the masculine preferred to the feminine.11
These beliefs— which women’s studies directly challenges — were used to
legitimize exclusion of women from educational institutions and, conse-
quently, from participation in many areas of public life.12 In challenging the
Cartesian method of knowing, therefore, feminists confront an entire system
of gendered social organization. Inclusion of women in institutions of higher
learning is accompanied by a revalorization of “feminine” ways of knowing:
feminists emphasize intuition, emotional commitment, and personal experi-
ence over traditional, “objective” methods of inquiry. By now, however,
many of us are wary of the way subjectivity, as an epistemic position
unrestrained by consideration for objectivity, can slide into pure subjec-
tivism.13
Feminist scientist Sandra Harding stands in direct contrast to writers who
reject tenets of objectivity outright: she calls for a stronger commitment to
objectivity. Harding (1991) points out that, paradoxically, the “objectivity”
feminists criticize is both too narrowly and too broadly applied. Objectivity
operationalizes the notion of maximum objectivity too narrowly:
The concept of value-free, impartial, dispassionate research is supposed to direct
the identification of all social values and their elimination from the results of
research, yet it has been operationalized to identify and eliminate only those
social values and interests that differ among the researchers and critics who are
regarded by the scientific community as competent to make such judgments. If
the community of “qualified” researchers and critics systematically excludes, for
example, all African Americans and women of all races . . . it is not plausible to
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imagine that racist and sexist values would be identified within a community of
scientists composed entirely of people who benefit — intentionally or not — from
institutional racism and sexism. (Harding, 1991, p. 143)
But objectivity also conceptualizes the desired value-neutrality too broadly:
“Objectivists claim that objectivity requires the elimination of all social
values and interests from the research process and the results of research. It
is clear, however, that not all social values and interests have the same bad
effects upon the results of research” (Harding, 1991, p. 144). Traditional
notions of objectivity, therefore, are contradictory. However, this contradic-
tory character is largely responsible for the usefulness and widespread
appeal of science to dominant groups. In its place Harding proposes a
concept of “strong objectivity” that extends scientific inquiry to include
systematic examination of background beliefs and the relationships that give
rise to and sustain these beliefs. She claims this maximizes, rather than
diminishes, commitment to objectivity. She also argues that this examination
can perhaps be best carried out by those, or from the perspective of those,
whose lives have been neglected and devalued by the hegemony of scientific
knowledge.
Also questioning scientific objectivity, Lorraine Code (1991) notes that
the epistemic agent of the Cartesian project parallels the autonomous
individual of Enlightenment humanism: like the juridic individual of classi-
cal liberal theory, the Cartesian knower exists a priori for the society of his
investigation. But, as Marilyn Frye (1983) notes, it is women’s work,
whether in the private or public realm, that re/produces and sustains this
preconstructed Subject, through personal service (the work of maids, cooks,
personal secretaries), sexual service (including provision for his genital
sexual needs and bearing of his children, but also including “being nice,”
“being attractive for him,” and so forth), and also ego service (encourage-
ment, support, praise, attention) (p. 10). By denying the body, Cartesian
epistemology cannot account for women’s activities, silencing women and
denigrating their experiential knowledge. Because very little of what we
know is actually a solitary accomplishment, Code argues for a way of
knowing that acknowledges both physical and cognitive interdependence.
She posits a relational approach to knowing that displaces the centred,
autonomous Subject, the hero of philosophical moral and political discourse.
This displacement requires a shift from “first-person” to “second-person”
knowing:
“Second person” thinking presupposes relationships qualitatively different from
the ones implied in third-persons talk about people. “Second persons” engage
with one another and care about the quality of that engagement — whether in
fondness or in fury. . . . Imposing meaning on someone’s existence from a
position removed from it and ignorant of, or indifferent to, its specificities is at
the furthest remove from second-persons relations in their normative dimension.
(Code, 1991, p. 86)
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She describes her position as constrained by objectivity and committed to
realism, but (because it refuses the tyranny of ideal objectivity, universality,
and gender-neutrality) capable of taking subjectivity, accountability, and a
range of perspectives seriously into account. The question raised for me —
and explored in the remainder of this paper — is what a relational approach
means in terms of subjectivity and objectivity in the classroom.
As Renate Klein (1987) notes, there has been until recently a remarkable
dearth of critical literature, particularly theoretical work, on feminist peda-
gogy. In the early years of women’s studies, discussion emphasized the
empowering of women as knowers in a “chilly” and silencing climate.
Drawing on the work of Carol Gilligan (1982), the invisibility and silence
of women in the classroom was generally interpreted as an effect not just of
gender dynamics advantageous to male students, but also of the fact that
women “have a different voice[s].” Classroom practice based on tenets of
critical pedagogy emphasized ways to encourage students to know them-
selves:
By speaking, in their “authentic voices,” students are seen to make themselves
visible and define themselves as authors of their own world. Such self-definition
presumably gives students an identity and political position from which to act as
agents of social change. Thus, although it is true that the teacher is directive, the
student’s own daily life experiences of oppression chart her/his path towards
self-definition and agency. The task of the critical educator thus becomes
“finding ways of working with students that enable the full expression of the
multiple “voices” engaged in dialogic encounter,” encouraging students of
different race, class, and gender positions to speak in self-affirming ways about
their experiences. (Ellsworth, 1989, p. 309)
Beginning from this commitment to affirm the authentic identities of
women, writers painted a glowing picture of the passion for learning that
characterizes feminism in the classroom (see Howe, 1985). Rosenfelt (1973),
for example, reported that “the enthusiasm and energy level of both faculty
and student participants are unusually high in Women’s Studies, with much
emphasis on consciousness-raising, self actualization and political activism”
(p. 1).
We ask of classes that they impart knowledge while raising critical questions;
that they consciously explore rather than suppress the feeling and imaginative
dimensions of knowing and thinking; that they help both students and teachers
know themselves better for having talked together. (Minnich, 1979, p. 6)14
I do not question the importance of subjectivity in the learning process
(see also Jaggar, 1989). Indeed, my most rewarding teaching experiences
stem from personal growth which occurs when “felt” — rather than purely
intellectual — connections are made between the “private troubles” of
women’s personal lives and the political agenda of the women’s liberation
movement. My introductory courses are explicitly organized around this
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theme and have for the most part been positive experiences. Where I have
encountered problems is in attempting to shift from an experientially-based
description of women’s personal lives to theoretical abstraction about wom-
en’s shared oppression and liberation (see also Bunch, 1979). In attempting
the latter, not all passion displayed by students has been unequivocally posi-
tive.
COLLIDING EXPECTATIONS: FEMINISM MEETS ACADEME
The particular example I have in mind arose during a large undergraduate
course designed as an introduction to feminist theory in the social
“sciences.” As such, a critique of disembodied Reason provided a point of
departure for the course, which explored ways consciousness-raising and
personal experience are a basis for feminist knowledge and the development
of distinctly feminist theory. Experience, then, was implicitly privileged as
a place from which to deconstruct patriarchal — but also feminist— knowl-
edge. Retrospectively, therefore, I should have been prepared for the resis-
tance to academic feminism among certain quarters of the class. During a
particularly emotional moment in debates on whether white women can fully
understand racial oppression and, in a similar vein, whether men can contri-
bute to the development of feminist knowledge, dissent led to a handful of
students walking out in protest. Reflecting a widespread view endorsed by
the postmodern emphasis on diversity and the politics of difference, whereby
all knowledge is viewed as partial, these students questioned who can speak
about, or on behalf of, others. More seriously, perhaps, their dissent signal-
led rejection of theoretical feminism: included in this disavowal of
knowledge disconnected from experience was my authority as an academic
“expert.” After all, what could someone with my privilege and identity know
about the actual lives of the poor and underprivileged, of women of colour,
or of women whose identities are not framed within the parameters of
patriarchal femininity?15
The surprise I experienced was unpleasant, given that dissent arose not
from those students whom I identify as “accidental tourists”16 in the class-
room, but rather from students politically engaged both on and off campus
in feminist politics. Having imagined these students to be the most likely
enthusiasts of a course designed by a feminist, on feminism, for feminists,
my disappointment led me intensely to re-examine the goals I held as a
feminist and, more generally, those of “feminist” pedagogy. My introspec-
tion began with an interrogation of my emotional response to these events,
then led me to seek a link between feminist pedagogy and Subject-ivity in
the classroom. On the surface, it appeared this particular protest was about
the validation of personal experiences of oppression. Lectures were accom-
panied by regular small-group discussions that gave students an opportunity
to share their experiences. This visibly reduced tension in the classroom and
dispelled scepticism about the willingness of students from diverse back-
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grounds and with different perspectives to respect others’ viewpoints. This
re-organization of the classroom format solved the immediate problem of
maintaining an atmosphere of trust and empathy, particularly between
students. Fundamental questions arose, however, about the epistemological
foundation of feminist pedagogy.
FROM OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE TO “CONNECTED” WAYS OF KNOWING
Exploring the dynamics of her classroom, Margo Culley (1985) describes
her students’ anger both at patriarchal society and at herself as a women’s
studies teacher (see also Baker, 1984; J. Nadelhaft, 1984; R. Nadelhaft,
1984). Although this anger was disturbing, she found that reclaiming rather
than denying it could be empowering for those involved:
The real danger of the anger in the feminist classroom . . . is if we cause our
students to assume the burden of emotions we will not acknowledge as our
own. . . . Yes, we are angry, and the feminist classroom is one arena where the
historical, social, economic, cultural and psychological sources of that anger can
be studied. Anger is an important source of energy for personal and social
change in facilitating the transition from passivity to action. (p. 216)
Similar to Culley, I wanted to learn about, but also learn from, my students’
anger.
Although it is not difficult for me to understand passionate resistance to
the materials and dynamics characteristic of “other,” traditionally oriented
courses, I was deeply disturbed by resistance to an approach grounded in
criticism and rejection of patriarchal knowledge. Thus my immediate res-
ponse related to the loss of authority. I was in a no-win situation: although
colleagues often discount my intellectual competence because of my feminist
commitments, feminists seemed to be saying that “I hadn’t got it right.”17
The temptation was to disavow my institutional authority; to assume the
stance that, ironically, because of our differences in identity there are no
differences in our abilities18 to talk about, or on the behalf, of women. The
contradictions of this position aside, in the final analysis it seemed to me
simply another way of confronting difference without transcending its con-
struction or investigating how this construction acts to create divisions of all
kinds. What I wanted was a way pedagogically to reconnect us in our dif-
ferences rather than simply to reaffirm difference, and thereby to connect
analytically the real/particular aspects of personal experience to the abstract/
general claims of theoretical knowledge.
The first level of connection that seemed necessary was between the
classroom and its broader political, cultural context. It had been a particular-
ly volatile term, characterized by a number of racist, homophobic, and sexist
occurrences across campus. Connecting these events to analytical/theoretical
materials covered during the course offered a way to transcend the subjectiv-
ism of purely personal feelings and reactions to the issues at hand, and to
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build on the notion of consciousness-raising as a principle of feminist
practice. Klein (1987) identifies consciousness-raising as one of the most
frequent themes in discussions of women’s studies “gynagogy” (p. 189).
Beginning in the early days of women’s studies courses, it was assumed that
the consciousness-raising (CR) so central to the women’s liberation move-
ment is integral to feminist teaching practice. As a teaching method, CR has
been defined as a process of “becoming conscious of something one did not
formerly perceive, raising something from the unconscious to the conscious
mind, or to heighten consciousness of oneself or a state of affairs” (Cassell,
1977). In this way, CR has been likened to becoming aware of the patriarch-
al nature of social reality and its construction by drawing on women’s
unarticulated experiences of oppression. Adopted as feminist practice,
consciousness-raising is linked to Marx’s concept of change through political
action of a group united by their recognition of shared oppression. When
Marx analyzed working-class oppression, he argued that liberation requires
class identity which would come not only through recognition by workers of
their “objective” position relative to the means of production, but also by
their “subjective” sense of having common identity and interest. Conjuncture
of the objective and the subjective creates class consciousness: unless the
proletariat is a “class for itself,” as well as a “class in itself,” it will not take
action on its own behalf (Jaggar, 1983, p. 333). For Marx, then, the role of
the philosopher/intellectual is not just to speculate about the need for
change, but to participate actively in shaping working-class consciousness.
This view has been adopted by critical educators,19 most notably Paulo
Freire. To Freire the goal of education is for knowers to become conscious
of themselves in historical perspective and actively to participate in the
creation of a political culture. He called this process “conscientização” and
described it as one of “learning to perceive social, political and economic
contradictions and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality”
(see Bowles & Klein, 1983, p. 126). Although Freire developed his approach
with oppressed peoples in the “third world,” feminist writers (see Belenky,
Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986; Klein, 1987) view this coming to
consciousness through dialogic relations as a means to empower especially
women as knowers. Belenky et al. see this coming to consciousness as
developmental,20 facilitated by feminist pedagogy. Here differences in ways
of knowing21 are accounted for in terms of the degree to which students are
able to combine subjective knowing with contextual, analytical thinking.
Their work offered a place to begin my search for understanding my goals
as a feminist teacher.
From interviews with women in various educational settings, Belenky et
al. (1986) maintain that in becoming “connected” knowers, students ideally
progress from passive recipients of knowledge who perceive authority
figures as sources of truth, to knowers actively engaged in the construction
of knowledge through the exercise of reason, intuition, and collaboration.
For them, the first transition occurs when the student rejects the view of
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truth as externally imposed and, instead, experiences truth as personal,
private, and subjectively known or intuited. The authors view this transition
as positive, in that women become their own authorities and then can move
toward greater autonomy and independence. At the same time, however, this
way of knowing is characterized by a rigid belief in right and wrong.
Consequently, it can lead to little tolerance for ambiguity, and blindness to
the way total reliance upon what “feels right” can be limiting. Thus develop-
ment of students requires that they transcend purely subjective knowing.
This involves incorporation of deliberated, systematic approaches to know-
ing, in a way that carries the student beyond knowing as simply a procedure
or “method.”
By procedural learning, Belenky et al. (1986) mean the type of analytical
training typical of most liberal arts education, which emphasizes the skill of
doubting and the abilities to listen to others and to recognize that debate and
argument are disagreements over position and not between persons (p. 104).
Although often a painful process that requires (temporarily) putting feelings
aside, procedural thinking enables the student to enter into a dialogue with
authorities and into public languages (such as those of science, law, or
medicine). The problem for the authors is that this procedural way of
knowing suppresses Self, because feelings and beliefs are excluded. They
thus describe the full development of student through what they call “con-
nected” knowing: knowing that is analytical, but not purely abstract or
impersonal. Connected knowing requires empathy and understanding rather
than purely separated, theoretical knowledge. The goal of connected know-
ing is life-long learning through incorporation of the quest for knowledge
into the student’s sense of well-being. The authors describe this way of
knowing as “opening of the mind and heart, to embrace the world” (p. 141).
Connected knowers in their study could listen to others without denying
Self, although, conversely, “talking about Self, from Self, does not make
women unable to hear and understand others.” This position connects the
knower to others beyond simply taking their standpoint, through shared
thinking.
Not surprisingly, Belenky et al. (1986) associate connected knowing not
with traditional learning in educational settings but rather with the type of
question-posing “central to maternal practice in its most evolved form”:
Question posing is at the heart of connected knowing. We argue that women’s
mode of talk, rather than being denigrated, should become a model for all who
are interested in promoting human development. It is through attentive love, the
ability to ask “What are you going through?” and the ability to hear the answer
that the reality of the child is both created and respected. (p. 189)
In formal learning, the authors equate question-posing as a classroom
method with competency-based learning, where the teacher no longer acts as
the embodiment of knowledge and so becomes less “important,” less the
authority and more a coach. Belenky et al. (1986) describe the ideal teacher
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as “midwife”: someone who assists students to give birth to their own ideas,
to make their own tacit knowledge explicit, and to elaborate it (p. 217).
Rather than depositing knowledge in the learner’s head, the midwife assists
in the birth of ideas, knowledge. Drawing on Ruddick’s notion of “maternal
thinking,” the authors suggest the midwife teacher’s first concern is to
preserve the student’s fragile thoughts, to see that they are born with their
truth intact, that they do not turn into acceptable lies. The second concern is
to support evolution of the student’s independent thinking (Belenky et al.,
1986, p. 218). In the final analysis, the midwife teacher emphasizes not her
own knowledge (as the lecturer does) but the student’s knowledge. She may
contribute when needed, but it is always clear that the baby is the student’s,
not hers (p. 218). The midwife teacher also tries to discern the truth inside
students (p. 224). Belenky et al. conclude:
that educators can help women develop their own authentic voices if they empha-
size connection over separation, understanding and acceptance over assessment,
and collaboration over debate; if they accord respect to and allow time for
knowledge that emerges from firsthand experience; if instead of imposing their
own expectations and arbitrary requirements, they encourage students to evolve
their own patterns of work based on the problems they are pursuing. (p. 229)
To these authors, then, feminist pedagogy as consciousness-raising is about
making connections: between the objectivity of analytical knowledge and
feminine compassion and intuition; between teacher and pupil; between
experience and theoretical knowledge. The teacher is characterized as facili-
tating this work.
Emphasizing these types of connections, Belenky et al. present an appeal-
ing picture of feminism in the classroom. As teacher, I know how positive
relationships with individual students can be, and how rewarding it is to
share in intellectual “coming into being.” In many ways, therefore, the
authors seemed to speak to my own goals as educator: to facilitate develop-
ment of critical thinking firmly rooted in the context of students’ lives and
in their self-perceptions as Subjects. When I compared Belenky et al.’s
experiences to my own, though, I soon saw that much of the appeal of their
work rests on idealizations.22 To be sure, empowerment of individual
students is a goal I would not want feminist pedagogy to abandon. However,
in my view idealization of the teacher-student relationship, particularly
through maternal metaphors, hides more than it reveals about classroom
dynamics.23 As teacher, I saw in my students’ protest a breakdown of what
I would have preferred to experience as a “partnership” in learning; on the
other hand, as a feminist I understood not only the depth of feeling dis-
cussions of sexism, heterosexism, and racism tap, but also the students’
correct identification of me as part of the university apparatus, representative
of the process whereby theorizing of primarily white middle-class academic
women is legitimized as “knowledge.” My response to events cannot be
separated from my professional/occupational position, which raises a number
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of contradictions about bringing feminism into the classroom.
The university where I teach is large, exceedingly bureaucratic, and
characterized by “old-guard” administration. The struggle to legitimize
feminism has been long, successful only through commitment of a handful
of faculty willing to take personal risks.24 In particular, I recognized the
ways my awareness of suspicion about feminism as “nonacademic” shapes
the ways I design curriculum, conduct classes, and “measure” my students’
individual “knowledge.” As untenured faculty, I do not feel “in charge” of
the classroom, able to ignore flagrantly the expectations of those who
evaluate my competence. At the same time, I accept the goal of feminism as
one of transforming the educational institution into a context that values
understanding over acquiring knowledge, encourages cooperative rather than
competitive learning, and cares more about the thinking of every individual
student than about the performance of the few “exceptional” students. The
problem is that this context as a goal makes much of what I do in my
teaching not simply irrelevant but contrary to these feminist goals. Once
again, I was faced with fundamental questions about what we can do as
educators, what we want to do as educators, and how these goals provide
the foundation of a feminist pedagogy. Like many questions that never “go
away,” these questions are not easy to answer. They forced me to re-think
the nature of connections — conceptual and political— we are trying to
make. In the following section, I discuss relational knowing as an alternative
way to achieve “connected” ways of knowing.
RE-THINKING CONNECTIONS
Although perhaps appealing, idealization of my relationship with students as
a maternal benefactor conceals precisely what I am attempting to bring to
consciousness as a goal of feminist pedagogy: full awareness of the nature
of social relations that construct the knowing Subject. As a goal this takes
the student’s quest for authenticity and Selfhood beyond the realm of
personal feelings and self-affirmation. The problem is that although we
indeed want to encourage acts of individual empowerment, expressions of
subjectivity cannot replace a deeper understanding of the Subject. Although
Belenky et al. propose that the student learn to connect their personal
experience and theoretical knowledge, they fail to demonstrate their own
awareness of this connection through an analysis of their role in the class-
room and of how this role reflects their relationships, as feminists, to the
women’s movement. Their model implicitly assumes that silencing of
women is the result of an educational practice founded on a masculine,
adversarial style of discourse25 (Clinchy, 1990, p. 62) rather than an effect
of power (see hooks, 1988). Similar to the way conscientization has been
understood by many in the women’s movement, in terms of becoming aware
of one’s suffering as a woman, Belenky et al. frame the oppression that
occurs in the classroom as a problem of group dynamics and role-specific
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behaviours, rather than one of social relationships (see Mies, 1983, p. 127).
Not only do maternal metaphors obscure very real differences between
teacher and student, they promote a benevolent view of power relations in
the classroom that can be misleading. Although we indeed may consciously
treat our students with compassion and sensitivity, objectively we are part of
a power structure. To suggest otherwise grossly oversimplifies our task by
leaving unaddressed those contradictions we face as feminist teachers, as
well as those students subjectively express through various protests in the
classroom. Although the kinds of confrontations I have encountered can be
painful, their neglect seriously undermines what I believe we want to
accomplish through feminist pedagogy. The remainder of this paper shall
therefore locate feminist pedagogy in its political, economic, and social
context, to help us rethink our goals as educators. The result is, I believe, a
much more radical view of the potential of feminist approaches to knowl-
edge.
To begin, I do not reject consciousness-raising as a useful method of
feminist pedagogy. However, as I have already noted, recognition of one’s
political membership in an oppressed group goes beyond subjective identifi-
cation with that group as an expression of Self-affirmation. Since my goal
was to acknowledge but yet strive to overcome divisions between women
based on membership in all kinds of oppressed groups, I was faced with the
question of how to transform my students’ “identity politics” into political
identity as a collective. As an act of subversion, identity politics resists Sub-
ject positions assigned by hegemonic discourses and is a way to reclaim the
authenticity of repressed histories and experiences. Although this act can be
empowering, in my classroom it became problematic because it led to epis-
temological relativism, whereby all/any criteria to adjudicate competing truth
claims were deemed invalid.26 As Harding (1991) notes, listening to different
voices and attending thoughtfully to others’ values and interests can enlarge
our vision and begin to correct for ethnocentrisms. However, preoccupation
with relativism can lead to the conclusion that because all knowledge is par-
tial, no knowledge is capable of universal truth claims. She points out that
relativism is, in fact, a logical complement to the absolutism of Eurocentric
thought: historically, relativism appears only when the hegemony of the
dominant group is being challenged (p. 153). For example, it allows men to
appear to acknowledge and accept feminist arguments without actually giv-
ing up any of the conventional androcentric beliefs and practices that operate
to their advantage (p. 154).
For similar reasons, Hazel Carby (1990) argues that identity politics is
compatible with liberal individualism and pluralist ideals of political change
(p. 85). Although “oppression” and “resistance” — categories associated with
identity politics— imply that membership in an oppressed group is a place
from which to take political action, the notions of “systemic exploitation”
and “revolution” — associated with socialist approaches to collective
change — are based on recognition of the nexus of social relations through
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which both the identity and the oppression of groups is constituted. This
recognition is made complex because, as Marx noted, social relations are not
always immediately apprehensible. There is no necessarily obvious connec-
tion between how experiences are “subjectively” felt or interpreted and how
they are “objectively” constituted. To Marx, this non-correspondence charac-
terized a capitalist society. In his analysis of commodity fetishism, Marx
connected subjectively experienced oppression through the market to the
objective relations through which market commodities are produced. In this
way, his use of historical materialism makes apparent those processes
beyond the individual that, although not immediately apprehended, actively
shape personal experience. It reveals experiential categories as expressions
of social relations. As Hartsock (1985) notes, Marx gained this understand-
ing by taking the perspective of the working class, rather than accepting as
given dominant meanings constructed by bourgeois economic theory. In
doing so, he posited two epistemological systems: one at the level of appear-
ance, given by activities of commodity exchange, through which profit is
realized; the other at the level of social relations, rooted in activities of the
working class, through which the value of commodities is produced. By arti-
culating his theory of exploitation, Marx illustrated that although the experi-
enced need of the proletariat for waged employment fosters the appearance
that economic expansion is in the interests of both the capitalist and working
classes, objectively the interests of these classes are mutually antagonistic.
This recognition of objective interests transforms the proletariat from a class
in itself into a class for itself. By bringing to awareness the social relations
that underlie class oppression, Marx’s theory epistemologically connects
individual experience and collective political action. Historical materialism
therefore provides a method of bringing both subjective and objective ways
of knowing into the development of theory, a way of connecting theory and
political action.
By similarly taking the perspective of women as an oppressed group,27
feminism has differentiated two epistemological systems: the official one, in
which masculine rationality and modes of action dominate and through
which patriarchal interests are furthered, and the other one, embedded in
women’s everyday activities and experiences, excluded from public/political
discourse. As an excluded discourse, the standpoint of women as an episte-
mology28 lies “latent” in the experiences of women. Thus Smith (1981)
argues that feminist inquiry must begin from the everyday lives of women
because their experiences will direct us to questions not yet posed by
traditional investigation. The current emphasis on difference reflects the fact
that, in doing this, feminism has revealed dominant categories of thought as
produced through relations not only of gender, but also of class, race, and
(hetero)sexuality. The problem is the tremendous diversity of experiences
among women excluded by a feminism authored primarily by white aca-
demic feminists (see hooks, 1984, 1988; Moraga & Anzaldúa, 1981; Rama-
zanoglu, 1989).
Despite the obvious advantages of providing a unified perspective for
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collective political action, a number of writers have argued that differences
among women mean that there can never be a standpoint of women. Winant
(1987) resolves this problem by defining standpoint as a location in the
political and cultural world that carries commitments to projects for political
and cultural transformation. Obviously there are many standpoints of
women, according to women’s varying specific locations in the social order.
However, any or all of these standpoints can be philosophically committed
to equality and the liberation of women (see also hooks, 1984). Further,
because women are embedded in multiple networks of relationships and
identities, any feminist standpoint is never complete or fixed, but must be
able to adapt to whatever emerges from work to eliminate oppression.
Sharing this view, Currie and Kline (1991) suggest that standpoint epis-
temology can deepen our understanding of the dilemmas and impasses that
are the current source of debates about the nature of feminist theory and of
differences between women, as well as between feminists. We view stand-
point epistemology as a way to make explicit the point from which inquiry
begins; unlike Cartesian epistemology, in which the knowing subject comes
from nowhere, the epistemic subject of feminism provides a view from
where she is. By thus identifying rather than obscuring the social located-
ness of author-ity and author-ship, standpoint epistemology provides a point
from which to interrogate and make apparent the workings of all noninclu-
sive discourses. As a pedagogical device, it therefore provides us with more
than simply a way of knowing: it brings to the fore questions about the
exclusionary nature of much feminist theory, about who has been included
in the production of feminist knowledge, and about the ways divisions
between women are revealed in what we do as feminist academics and femi-
nist teachers. Although these questions emphasize the instability rather than
coherence and stability of central feminist concepts, Harding (1989), main-
tains that this instability characterizing current feminist thought should be
viewed as a resource rather than liability: if we can learn how to use it,
feminism can invent a new kind of theorizing (p. 34).
As Marlee Kline (1989) notes:
white privileged feminists have always maintained and still maintain hegemonic
control over feminist discourse. If we now attempt to maintain the appearance of
uniformity and universality for strategic reasons at the expense of ignoring our
own hegemonic position and the challenges of, among other things, women of
color, we risk irreparable fragmentation. (p. 147)
Kline concludes that acceptance of the challenge to acknowledge and to
understand heterogeneity and complexity of experience and oppression will
ultimately be feminism’s strength, not its weakness. She further notes that
working toward solidarity rather than maintaining a pretence of union will
not be easy: conflict, resistance, and anger are likely to ensue. With these
comments in mind, I return to the classroom as a site of feminist struggle
and of feminist learning.
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CONNECTIONS IN THE CLASSROOM
In the final analysis, academic feminism cannot be separated from the
women’s liberation movement; indeed, feminist pedagogy emphasizes this
connection (see Howe, 1979; Rutenberg, 1983). We should not be surprised,
therefore, that the conflicts and struggles of the latter play out in the class-
room. I believe the relational thinking of standpoint epistemology can help
us explore these conflicts. Although relational thinking is about making
connections, it goes beyond Belenky et al.’s notion of “connected knowers,”
which does not sufficiently challenge the Archimedean point of inquiry.
Connected knowing, as described in Women’s Ways of Knowing, retains
what Code (1991) refers to as the first person Subject — the “I” as a privi-
leged centre of constructed knowledge.29 Relational knowing, which can
show how persons are essentially second persons, has the heuristic value of
withholding endorsement of the autonomy, self-sufficiency, and/or self-
making the philosophers consider integral to mature moral agency. There is
no sense that, as second persons, people naturally become and operate as
autonomous and self-sufficient individuals, only incidentally engaged in
relationships. Second personhood, although a necessary condition for human
existence, is precisely what is suppressed in traditional philosophy, which
then denies inter-subjectivity in knowing. In order to know the world as
second persons, Code (1991) rejects strict objectivity in favour of “passion-
ate detachment”30: a kind of objective sympathy, a mode of participation
without intervention, of compassion without passion (p. 108). It requires a
kind of perception at once cognitive and affective. As a moral agent, the
Subject positions and repositions herself within a situation to become clear
about what is at issue and to examine possible courses of action — always
within the situation, for no God’s-eye vantage point is available. Hence the
deliberate position that emerges is dialogic, open to criticisms, self-criticism,
and debate (Code, 1991, p. 109).
Although my notion of relational knowing similarly accepts “objective
sympathy,”31 it further provides a method for objective analysis of common-
alties from which sympathetic knowing others may, or may not, become
political allies. What I have in mind is perhaps closer to Linda Alcoff’s
(1989) epistemic model, which combines identity politics— which has the
positive effect of introducing identity as a factor in political analysis— with
a concept of the Subject of positionality (p. 323). She notes that the external
situation determines a person’s relative position in a network of elements
involving others, the objective economic conditions, cultural and political
institutions and ideologies, and so on. Through social criticism and analysis
we can identify women via their position relative to an existing cultural and
social network. The key difference between her approach and other analyses
of women’s relative position is Alcoff’s insistence that the very subjectivity
(or subjective experience of being a woman) and the very identity of women
is constituted by women’s position. Thus emphasis on positionality includes
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two points: the concept of women as a relational term identifiable only
within a (constantly moving) context, and recognition that the position in
which women find themselves can be actively utilized (rather than tran-
scended) as a location for construction of meaning, as a place where mean-
ing is constructed rather than discovered (Alcoff, 1989, p. 324).
This approach can help us understand the need for female students to
affirm their varying identities, as women but also as members of other
marginalized groups. We should take this demand for affirmation in the
classroom as a reminder that academic feminism is “produced” by privileged
women, in a context that is in many ways a microcosm of the nonacademic
world. However, I disagree with writers who imply that everything that the
student needs to know is already embedded in consciousness, merely waiting
to be born (see also Grant, 1987). It seems to me that the classroom is a
good place to begin to learn how processes and things about which we are
not aware can, despite our unknowing, have “felt” effects. In the words of
bell hooks (1988), perhaps the most revolutionary potential for feminist
pedagogy is that it engages students in a learning process that makes the
world more rather than less real (p. 51). Although it may appear or “feel”
that classroom experience is shaped — if not controlled— by the instructor,
both discursive and non-discursive practices played out there reflect broader
relations of ruling (see also Glazer, 1987). In my university, decisions that
directly affect classroom practice— the hiring of “experts,” the approval of
course descriptions, the assignment of grades through conventional measures
of individual performance, the rhythm of learning as determined by bureau-
cratic timetables — are made in a way neither democratic nor progressive.
One consequence is an educational practice that favours co-optation. In the
current climate of corporatism and the underfunding especially of liberal
arts, I do not expect my university to become a more supportive environ-
ment for radically liberating education, at least not in the near future. To be
sure, we teachers can play a role in our individual, personal relations with
students. We have the potential to run the classroom along democratic lines,
to encourage participation, to empathize with students’ uncertainties and
problems in a way that encourages individual self-affirmation and empowers
students, to be flexible in our expectations (see Shrewsbury, 1987). Indeed,
most feminist teachers (female and male) whom I know adopt these prin-
ciples as a matter of conscious choice. At the same time, I have found the
classroom can seldom be an enclave of genuine democracy, reciprocity, and
equality. I believe it is misplaced — if not dangerous — optimism to present
it as such. Rather, it seems to me that the classroom is a good place to
practice a pedagogy based on relational knowing, a place to connect every-
day experiences of individual struggle for a meaningful “education” to the
broader feminist struggle to have the diversity of women’s experiences
included in the production of official knowledge and legitimate meaning.
Building these connections requires analysis of the relations through
which women’s experiences and knowledges have been excluded from
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official knowledge (see Smith, 1980, 1987). This analysis affirms the need
for distinctly “women’s studies” programs and feminist approaches to learn-
ing. At the same time, this analysis of women’s exclusion must incorporate
awareness of the ways the university, as a site of women’s current inclusion,
is one constructed through relations of ruling that in/exclude women on the
basis of class membership, as well as racial, sexual, and other identities. The
division of intellectual and manual labour, as much as patriarchal relations,
separates the classroom from the women’s liberation movement: real divi-
sions underlie relationships that constitute “the classroom.” Academic femin-
ists are not simply feminists who have been college-educated. For the large
part, we are white, middle-class, heterosexual women. Challenging the dis-
cursive hegemony of institutionalized feminism, of which we are a part, is
not simply a conceptual struggle, nor one about classroom dynamics. As
outlined above, it begins from awareness of social relations of domination
and oppression, but has as its goal the real— not merely conceptual — trans-
formation of these relations. The dilemma clearly is that feminism within the
academy is necessarily part of the same community that, ironically, gave rise
to the need for “feminist studies” in the first place. This paradox raises
haunting, and perhaps unanswerable, questions. Can feminist pedagogy pos-
sibly bring about, or even help to bring about, a revolution of the sort
required to alter our dilemma? Or, is our theorizing a substitute for actions
that would help bring about that sort of revolution?32
Gloria Bowles (1983) maintains that as feminists and as academics we are
simultaneously working within, as well as against, the academy (p. 32).
Although working against the university brings us into conflict with those
colleagues (male and female) who identify with the relations of ruling that
govern the university, working within the university may bring us into
conflict with our students, who see us as part of the relations of ruling.
Although the latter may feel contrary to our own experiences of being
oppressed as feminist academics, our students’ objective recognition of the
relations through which feminism exists in the university should be read as
a hope for change. Mary Evans (1983) notes:
It may be quite unsisterly to think this, but the thought does cross our minds that
there is a huge difference between attacking the hierarchical organization of the
academy, a kind of radical chic, and actually being confronted by people who are
going to take this idea seriously enough to want to challenge it, and us. (pp. 326–
327)
From this perspective, acts of rebellion do not simply mirror the contradic-
tions and divisions within the women’s movement: they represent resistance
to the domination of feminism by privileged women. To be sure, student
protestations and confrontations do not make feminist teaching easy. How-
ever, it seems to me that they answer, in part, the neglected question “who
shall educate the educators?” If our political identity is with the women’s
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liberation movement — as we claim— it is not the experiences of other aca-
demic feminists that can teach us the most about what we need to know.
In closing, we are a long way from the idealized situation when it comes
to feminist pedagogy as student-directed learning and political education.
There are real exclusionary practices that prevent students from being
“partners in knowledge” and instructors from playing a “midwife” role.
Once we acknowledge our place in the nexus of relations that constitute the
university, we cannot wish away our privilege in the classroom, although
obviously we can be sensitive to its effects. At the same time, I do not
believe we should abandon any hope of a meaningful approach to learning.
I have tried to suggest here that we must come to terms with our own
identities and memberships in privileged groups before we can help students
challenge the conditions of their existence. Ironically, this means that we
need to emphasize our position in the classroom as one of power, rather than
to mystify or obscure the very real ways we are agents in an oppressive
institution. As Evans (1983) notes, from the student’s perspective disagree-
ing with an identifiably sexist male is one thing; disagreeing with a woman
who prefaces all her remarks with an invocation of sisterhood is another, far
more fearful experience (p. 219). Although I emphasize that the interests of
teachers often conflict with those of students, I believe this is unavoidable.
For myself, the angst produced by this conflict has been a stimulus for
continual re-evaluation of what I want to accomplish in the classroom.
ENDNOTES
1 I thank Shauna Butterwick, University of British Columbia, and Faye Wiesen-
berg, University of Calgary, for helpful comments on this paper. I also thank
Helga Jacobson for her collegial support in my continual struggle to under-
stand what it means to be a feminist teacher.
2 We now recognize that this equation, although usual as a political slogan, is
far too simplistic when it comes to the diversity of approaches to research
done by feminists. See Carol Smart (1984) and Maureen Cain (1986), for ex-
ample.
3 Obviously, these two issues are interrelated.
4 See Mary Evans (1983) and Janet Radcliffe Richards (1980).
5 This does not apply, of course, to the collision of women’s experiences and
patriarchal knowledge, the subject of much discussion in feminist critiques of
knowing (see especially Smith, 1987). Bunch (1979) and hooks (1984, 1988),
in particular, discuss anti-intellectualism in the women’s movement.
6 By women as knowers, I refer to both students and teachers.
7 The primacy of Reason as the foundation of Western thinking has a long
history. Although it is commonly associated with Rene Descartes, Plato pre-
sented intellectual life as “a purging of the rational soul from the follies of the
body” (in Lloyd, 1984, p. 6; see also Grosz, 1987). Later Judaic and Christian
thinkers elaborated upon this separation and thus legitimized its adoption by
early scientists like Francis Bacon, known for his use of sexual metaphors in
scientific writing.
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8 For a discussion of how the masculinization of Science is seen in scientific
practice, see especially Easlea (1983). Lloyd (1984) points out that Descartes
believed his account of the mind opened the way to a new egalitarian pursuit
of knowledge (p. 48). Lorraine (1990) draws attention to contemporaries of
Descartes who advanced alternatives to this disembodied view of knowing.
9 Added to scientific discoveries are the anthropological discoveries that accom-
panied the exploration (exploitation) of the New World. See Young-Bruehl
(1987).
10 This is also true of peoples not of European origin or descent. See chapter 7
of Harding (1986).
11 Similarly, white is preferred over black.
12 The recent emergence of legal debates about whether women committing
crimes during the premenstrual part of their monthly cycle are not to be held
wholly accountable for their acts is a good illustration of why this equation of
women with their bodies is not outdated (see Kendall, 1992).
13 In this paper I use the term subjectivity to refer to the sensations and feelings
through which we can know about the physical and social world. I recognize
that we make sense of these sensations and feelings (subjective experience)
through culturally prescribed meanings and values. By subjectivism, I refer to
an epistemological or political position for which knowledge claims are based
entirely upon personal feelings, opinion, preference, and so on (see also
Radcliffe Richards, 1980).
14 For discussion of how this can be oppressive for some students, see Ellsworth
(1989). Briskin (1990) too points out that in the classroom the appearance of
having transferred power and authority to the student can actually amount to
abdication of our responsibilities as teachers.
15 Since beginning this paper (in 1990), I have become aware that a number of
my colleagues have been challenged by their students in a similar way.
16 I use this term to describe those students mildly curious about, but not
actively committed to, feminism and feminist knowing.
17 Informal discussions with my feminist colleagues reveal the sense of diffi-
culty — not the unadulterated pleasure many of us anticipated — of teaching
feminist courses. It is worrisome that students’ resistance to problematic
aspects of bringing feminism into the academy can reinforce the many ways
the university undermines women’s sense of authority. Hartung (1990), for
example, describes the selective rejection of women faculty members by
students at her university. She notes that although women’s studies courses
earn high evaluations by students, the instructors in these courses are harshly,
even cruelly, assessed. See also the review article by Renate Klein (1987).
18 Here I refer to socially constructed abilities and not to a notion that there are
innate differences in cognitive capacities.
19 A crucial debate here concerns the important distinction between university
educators as “intellectuals” and as “academics.”
20 The authors are by their own admission sufficiently evasive to allow for
varying interpretations of the changes identified as a progression of stages
(Mary Belenky and Blythe Clinchy, seminar on Women’s Ways of Knowing
held at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, on 27 April 1991).
21 These authors prefer the term “ways of knowing” to the term “having knowl-
edge,” which implies the “storehouse” view of knowledge as a product to be
acquired and hoarded.
22 These idealizations include not only relationships but practical issues such as
the size of the class and requirements of the particular university, for example.
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23 See Briskin’s (1990) discussion of how students’ expectation that they will be
“mothered” by their female teachers simply reproduces dominant sex-role
stereotypes and can foster resentment toward female instructors who depart
from maternal expectations.
24 I find it an uncanny coincidence to be revising this paper during a strike for
pay equity by the predominantly female support workers at my university. Not
only did this strike directly bring to light the “academic” materials covered in
my gender relations class, it also provided a very real moment of political
activism that often — but not always — cut across divisions of gender, class,
race, and other identities.
25 On this basis — as Code (1991) notes — a central problem raised in this work
is that the authors become preoccupied with how students learn, bracketing
questions of what they learn or of how to assess competing truth claims. For
an illustration of how issues of feminist teaching (and of power in the class-
room) are reduced to questions of style, see Gabriel and Smithson (1990).
26 Here I want to point out that reclaiming identity for political purposes differs
from doing so for epistemological purposes. I have experienced the former at
public meetings or events where identity politics, although at times discom-
forting, is necessary as a way to draw attention to racism, homophobia, and
other unacknowledged group dynamics.
27 It is more correct to say the perspective of women in Eurocentric patriarchal
societies. The following discussion is based on that starting point.
28 Smith refers to this approach as taking the standpoint of women. Writers
following Smith have subsequently called this approach “standpoint episte-
mology” or “feminist standpoint theory.” Unfortunately, differing interpreta-
tions and uses have led to a number of problematic claims. One is the claim
that Smith is advancing the notion of a unified feminist standpoint. To avoid
some of these difficulties and to emphasize Smith’s approach as a method of
inquiry (and not a theory), I use the term “standpoint epistemology.”
29 When translated into political practice, the first person can lead to the “us
versus them” phenomenon.
30 Code attributes this provocative notion to Annette Kuhn (1982).
31 Here use of the term “sympathy” refers to a relationship between persons or
things wherein whatever affects one similarly affects the other (Webster’s
Seventh Collegiate Dictionary, 1970). In terms of affects, see Patti Lather’s
(1988) provocative discussion of feminist pedagogy.
32 These questions, the logical endpoint of the discussion here, were raised by an
anonymous reviewer. At this time I do not know how to answer them.
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